

AN IMPERATIVE FOR THE CIA:
PROFESSIONALISM FREE OF POLITICS
AND PARTISANSHIP .

SENATOR FRANK CHURCH
(11 NOVEMBER 1975)

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"FOR YE SHALL KNOW THE TRUTH AND THE TRUTH SHALL MAKE YOU FREE." SO READ THE WORDS CARVED IN WHITE MARBLE AT THE ENTRANCE TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. IT IS A NOBLE BIBLICAL THOUGHT, CHOSEN BY ALLEN DULLES WHEN HE WAS DIRECTOR OF THE CIA PERHAPS TO REMIND HIS COLLEAGUES OF THEIR ULTIMATE PURPOSE: THE CREATION OF OBJECTIVE INTELLIGENCE.

OBJECTIVITY OUGHT TO BE THE HALLMARK OF EVERY PUBLIC TRUST. AS CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, I HAVE DONE MY UTMOST TO ASSURE A FAIR AND BALANCED INQUIRY INTO THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. WHEN THE COMMITTEE WAS FIRST ESTABLISHED, SENATE MAJORITY LEADER MIKE MANSFIELD STRESSED THAT THE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES WERE SERIOUS. THEY DESERVED, HE SAID, A SOBER INQUIRY WHICH WOULD BE "NEITHER A WHITEWASH NOR A VENDETTA." THAT IS HOW I HAVE TRIED TO CONDUCT THIS INVESTIGATION.

CERTAINLY IT HAS NOT BEEN A WHITEWASH. THE COMMITTEE HAS ALREADY EXPOSED MANY SERIOUS ABUSES OF POWER WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. WORKING STEADFASTLY FOR NINE MONTHS, THE SELECT COMMITTEE HAS AMASSED A COMPREHENSIVE SET OF RECORDS, DOCUMENTS, AND SWORN TESTIMONY.

THIS MONTH, THE COMMITTEE WILL PUBLISH A DETAILED INTERIM REPORT ON ASSASSINATION. THE COMMITTEE HAS VOTED TO MAKE THE REPORT PUBLIC, DESPITE AN APPEAL BY THE PRESIDENT TO SUPPRESS IT. BASED ON THE SWORN TESTIMONY OF OVER 100 WITNESSES, SOME 8,000 PAGES OF TRANSCRIPTS, AND COUNTLESS HOURS OF RESEARCH,

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THIS REPORT EXAMINES THE INVOLVEMENT OF OUR GOVERNMENT IN FOREIGN ASSASSINATION INTRIGUE DURING THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF FOUR PRESIDENTS, EISENHOWER, KENNEDY, JOHNSON, AND NIXON. PIECING TOGETHER THE AVAILABLE EVIDENCE HAS BEEN AN EXTRAORDINARILY DIFFICULT JOB. BUT THE RESULT HAS BEEN AS PENETRATING AN INQUIRY INTO THIS REGRETABLE CHAPTER OF OUR HISTORY AS THE OBTAINABLE FACTS WILL ALLOW.

BEYOND IDENTIFYING THREATS TO THE LIBERTY OF AMERICAN CITIZENS, THE COMMITTEE IS WORKING DILIGENTLY TO ESTABLISH LEGISLATIVE SAFEGUARDS TO BETTER PROTECT THEIR RIGHTS IN THE FUTURE. THESE PROPOSALS FOR REFORM WILL BE THE FOCUS OF PUBLIC HEARINGS LATER THIS YEAR.

SO, A WHITEWASH THIS INVESTIGATION IS NOT.

JUST AS CLEARLY, IT IS NOT A VENDETTA.

IN THE INTERESTS OF FAIRNESS, WHEREVER THE CIA HAS BEEN WRONGLY CHARGED, I HAVE BEEN QUICK TO SAY SO. SOME ALLEGED EARLIER THIS YEAR THAT THE CIA HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN PLOTS TO MURDER CHARLES DEGAULLE, THE LATE PRESIDENT OF FRANCE. AN IMMEDIATE REVIEW OF THE FACTS SHOWED NO SUCH PLOT WAS EVER CONTEMPLATED BY THE CIA OR ANY OTHER AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED WAS THIS: A CIA AGENT WAS APPROACHED BY A FOREIGN CITIZEN WHO MADE A TOTALLY UNSOLICITED SUGGESTION OF A PLAN TO KILL DEGAULLE. THE PLAN WAS REJECTED AT ONCE BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

ON ANOTHER OCCASION, THE ACCUSATION WAS MADE THAT THE CIA HAD PERIODICALLY "INFILTRATED" THE WHITE HOUSE AND OTHER EXECUTIVE AGENCIES. SPECIFICALLY, IT WAS SAID THAT ALEXANDER BUTTERFIELD, AN AIDE TO PRESIDENT NIXON, HAD SERVED IN THE WHITE HOUSE AS A SPY FOR THE CIA. THERE WAS NO SCINTILLA OF EVIDENCE THAT MR. BUTTERFIELD HAD SPIED ON THE PRESIDENT FOR THE CIA. I ANNOUNCED THIS FINDING AS QUICKLY AS IT COULD BE CONFIRMED, IN THE INTEREST OF FAIRNESS BOTH TO THE CIA AND MR. BUTTERFIELD.

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WHERE THE CIA HAS ERRED, THE COMMITTEE WILL SAY SO; WHERE IT HAS PERFORMED WITH MERIT, THE COMMITTEE WILL ACKNOWLEDGE THAT AS WELL. IN SHORT, OUR OBJECTIVE HAS NEVER BEEN TO WRECK THE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM, BUT TO EXPOSE WRONGFUL AND UNLAWFUL CONDUCT, SO THAT NEEDED REFORMS CAN BE WRITTEN INTO LAW."

IN APPRAISING THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, A SUBJECT OF PARTICULAR CONCERN IS THE QUALITY OF OUR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES, OR NIEs AS THEY ARE MORE COMMONLY CALLED. THE PREPARATION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES IS A MOST IMPORTANT TASK, FOR THE NIEs FORM THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY. PUT BRIEFLY, AN INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE IS A PAPER PREPARED BY THE CIA IN COOPERATION WITH THE OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICES WHICH ASSESSES THE CURRENT SITUATION IN SOME PART OF THE WORLD, OR ANALYZES THE MAJOR FORCES AT WORK--POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, MILITARY, SOCIOLOGICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL--ON SOME ASPECT OF THE WORLD SITUATION. OFTEN AN ESTIMATE WILL GO FURTHER AND MAKE A PREDICTION ABOUT FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS. IN THIS SENSE, AN ESTIMATE IS A FORECAST, A JUDGMENT, A "SHREWD GUESS" AS TO WHAT IS LIKELY TO HAPPEN.

ALTHOUGH IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT THE PRECISE COURSE OF EVENTS, THE GOOD NIE DESCRIBES IN DETAIL HOW VARIOUS PARTIES INVOLVED VIEW A SITUATION, AND HOW THEY MIGHT ACT TOWARD HYPOTHETICAL CHANGES. THE ESTIMATE WILL LAY OUT, AND OFTEN RANK, A RANGE OF POSSIBLE OUTCOMES, ESPECIALLY THOSE THAT THREATEN AMERICAN INTERESTS OR PRESENT AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE UNITED STATES.

THE VALUE OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES TO THE DECISION MAKERS IN OUR GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE IMMENSE. OUR NATIONAL SECURITY COULD DEPEND UPON RELIABLE JUDGMENTS AS TO FUTURE ACTIONS AND CAPABILITIES OF HOSTILE NATIONS. THE NATIONAL ESTIMATE IS THE FINAL PRODUCT OF AN INTRICATE GATHERING AND EVALUATION OF INTELLIGENCE, DRAWN FROM ALL SOURCES.

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IF NIEs ARE ACCURATE AND TIMELY, AND DECISION MAKERS HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THEM, WE'VE SPENT OUR MONEY WELL. BUT WE HAVE BOTH WASTED MONEY AND POSED AN ADDED DANGER TO OUR SAFETY IF OUR ESTIMATES ARE INACCURATE, OR IF THEY HAVE BEEN DISTORTED BY ANALYTIC OR POLICY BIAS. MISTAKEN ESTIMATES OF ENEMY INTENTIONS HOLD A POTENTIAL FOR NATIONAL DISASTER. THIS WE LEARNED ALMOST TOO LATE, PRIOR TO 1962, FROM THE ESTIMATE WHICH ASSURED US THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT PLACE NUCLEAR-TIPPED MISSILES IN CUBA.

WE HAVE HAD OTHER MISTAKEN ESTIMATES. THE PROFESSIONALS HAVE ERRED IN OVERESTIMATING THE GROWTH OF SOVIET ICBM FORCES. THE MISCONCEIVED "MISSILE GAP" IN THE EARLY 1960'S IS ONE ILLUSTRATION. THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES ON THE SOVIET INVASIONS INTO HUNGARY IN 1956 AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN 1968 WERE ALSO WIDE OF THE MARK. BY FAR THE WORST FAILURE OF THE ESTIMATIVE PROCESS IN MANY YEARS WAS THE MISREADING OF THE IMMINENCE OF THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR.

IN A WORD, OUR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES HAVE CERTAINLY BEEN FALLIBLE. THE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IS TO BE STRONGLY COMMENDED FOR EXAMINING RECENT ESTIMATES BY THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES WHICH HAVE PROVEN TO BE INACCURATE. SUCH FAILURES NEED TO BE EXPOSED SO WE WILL NOT DEVELOP A BLIND FAITH IN OUR INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES.

HOWEVER, WE SHOULD NOT FORGET THAT ON OTHER OCCASIONS, OUR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES HAVE PROVEN TO BE ACCURATE AND VALUABLE. ADMITTEDLY, THE CIA DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY HAS NOT YET DEVELOPED A CRYSTAL BALL. PREDICTING THE FUTURE MUST REMAIN PROBABILISTIC. THOUGH THE CIA DID GIVE AN EXACT WARNING OF THE DATE LAST YEAR WHEN TURKEY WOULD INVADE CYPRUS, SUCH PRECISION WILL BE RARE. SIMPLY TOO MANY UNPREDICTABLE FACTORS ENTER INTO MOST SITUATIONS. THE INTRINSIC ELEMENT OF CAPRICE IN THE AFFAIRS OF MEN AND NATIONS IS THE HAIR SHIRT OF THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATOR.

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WHEN THE SOVIET UNION MOBILIZED TROOPS IN THE SUMMER OF 1968 TO THREATEN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, NO SOLID INDICATION WAS AVAILABLE ONE WAY OR THE OTHER AS TO WHEN, OR EVEN IF, THE ASSEMBLED FORCES WOULD ACTUALLY BE USED. THE POLITBURO WAS SHARPLY DIVIDED ON THE ISSUE OF INTERVENTION. THE DECISION NOW APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN TAKEN ONLY A FEW HOURS BEFORE THE INVASION WAS LAUNCHED ON AUGUST 20TH. THOUGH THE MOBILIZATION OF SOVIET TROOPS WAS DULY REPORTED BY THE CIA, NO ONE COULD SAY FOR SURE WHAT THE POLITBURO DECISION WOULD BE--THEY THEMSELVES DID NOT KNOW UNTIL THE LAST MINUTE.

WHILE IT IS UNREASONABLE TO EXPECT PRECISE PREDICTIONS, A DEVELOPING SITUATION OUGHT TO BE WELL-UNDERSTOOD AND REPORTED TO POLICY MAKERS. ALSO, COMPETENT INTELLIGENCE SHOULD SHIELD THE UNITED STATES AGAINST MAJOR SURPRISES. IN THIS FIELD, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES EARN HIGHER MARKS. EXAMPLES ARE PLENTIFUL IN THE CRITICAL AREAS OF MILITARY, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE.

MILITARILY, THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES MUST DETECT NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS. BEFORE ANYTHING ELSE, WE NEED TO KNOW THE NUMBERS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WEAPONS THAT CAN STRIKE US DIRECTLY, THE DOCTRINE FOR THEIR USE, INTENTIONS FOR FURTHER DEPLOYMENT, AND, MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE NEW WEAPONS STILL ON THE DRAWING BOARDS. IN THE LAST 25 YEARS, NO IMPORTANT NEW SOVIET WEAPONS SYSTEM, FROM THEIR H-BOMB TO THEIR MOST RECENT MISSILES, HAS APPEARED WHICH HAD NOT BEEN HERALDED IN ADVANCE BY NIEs. THE NEW SOVIET POLARIS-TYPE "Y" MISSILES AND THE SUBMARINES ON WHICH THEY ARE CARRIED WERE ANTICIPATED WELL BEFORE THE FIRST BOATS SLID DOWN THE WAYS.

THE CIA, WITH THE HELP OF THE OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, IDENTIFIED AND MONITORED THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET ABM SYSTEM AROUND MOSCOW SOME 7 YEARS BEFORE IT BECAME OPERATIONAL. INDIVIDUAL ABM RADARS WERE IDENTIFIED IN THE EARLY PHASES OF THEIR CONSTRUCTION--UP TO 5 YEARS BEFORE THEY BECAME ACTIVE.

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OUR GOVERNMENT WOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ENTER INTO THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS WERE IT NOT FOR THE ABILITY OF THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES TO VERIFY--THAT IS, DETECT THROUGH OUR OWN INDEPENDENT MEANS--ANY SIGNIFICANT VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENTS. THIS CAPABILITY GAVE US THE CONFIDENCE TO TAKE THIS IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD ARMS CONTROL. MOREOVER, U.S. INTELLIGENCE STUDIES ON SOVIET STRATEGIC MISSILE PROGRAMS, AS THEY MIGHT DEVELOP WITHOUT A FURTHER SALT AGREEMENT, PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN DETERMINING THE CEILINGS REACHED AT VLADIVOSTOK.

EVEN IN THE ESTIMATE FAILURE I CITED EARLIER CONCERNING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, WE SHOULD NOT FORGET THAT ULTIMATELY IT WAS THE CIA-DEVELOPED U-2 PLANE WHICH DETECTED THE MISSILES IN TIME FOR US TO ACT. MOREOVER, TWO MONTHS BEFORE, JOHN McCONE, THEN DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, HAD WARNED HIS COLLEAGUES ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF HIS BELIEF THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT PLACE BALLISTIC MISSILES IN CUBA. HE IN FACT TOOK ISSUE WITH THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE THAT DISCOUNTED THIS POSSIBILITY.

THE ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES WE HAVE RECEIVED HAVE ALSO BEEN VALUABLE. THE GREAT WEALTH OF OPEC GOVERNMENTS NOW GIVES THEM AN ENORMOUS POTENTIAL TO EXERT INFLUENCE AND TO CREATE DISRUPTION THROUGHOUT THE WESTERN WORLD. THE QUADRUPLING OF OIL PRICES IN 1973-74 HAS GIVEN THEM A HUGE SURPLUS TO INVEST--OVER \$40 BILLION IN THIS YEAR ALONE.

OUR INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN TRACKING THE FLOW OF PETRODOLLARS WORLDWIDE AND HAVE ALERTED U.S. POLICY MAKERS TO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN OPEC INVESTMENT STRATEGIES. IN ADDITION TO COMPREHENSIVE ESTIMATES ON PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION, AND PRICING, THEY HAVE GIVEN US TIMELY ASSESSMENTS ON THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF OPEC AS A CARTEL AND THE AVAILABILITY OF ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF ENERGY.

TO FURTHER ASSIST THE STATE DEPARTMENT IN ITS OVERSEAS RELATIONS, THE CIA REGULARLY PREPARES VALUABLE BIOGRAPHIC

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PROFILES ON POLITICAL OFFICIALS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, MANY OF WHOM WOULD OTHERWISE REMAIN STRANGERS TO US, CONCEALED WITHIN THEIR CLOSED SOCIETIES.

THESE EXAMPLES ILLUSTRATE THE POINT: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE IS BY NO MEANS LIMITED TO THE PREDICTION OF SPECIFIC EVENTS. ITS PRIMARY PURPOSE IS TO HELP OUR LEADERS PROTECT THE NATIONAL INTEREST BY MAKING AVAILABLE THE BEST POSSIBLE UNDERSTANDING OF FOREIGN CAPABILITIES, LEADERS, AND DEVELOPING EVENTS.

TO ACCOMPLISH THIS PURPOSE, WE MUST CONTINUE TO DEMAND OF OUR INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS THE STANDARDS SUGGESTED BY SHERMAN KENT, WHO FOR MANY YEARS WAS CHAIRMAN OF THE CIA BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES. HE OBSERVED THAT THESE MEN AND WOMEN MUST HAVE "THE BEST IN PROFESSIONAL TRAINING, THE HIGHEST INTELLECTUAL INTEGRITY, AND A VERY LARGE AMOUNT OF WORLDLY WISDOM."

BUT THIS IN ITSELF WILL NOT BE SUFFICIENT. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT WE PRESERVE THE PROFESSIONAL STATURE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, KEEPING IT FREE FROM THE ERODING FORCES OF POLITICS AND PARTISANSHIP. ONLY IN THIS WAY WILL THE CIA CONTINUE TO SERVE AS AN ADEQUATE COUNTERBALANCE TO THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES FROM THE MILITARY SERVICES. IF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY BECOMES SO DISCREDITED THROUGH AN OVER-EMPHASIS ON ITS FAILURES IN THE DRAWING OF ESTIMATES, WE MAY FIND THIS CRUCIAL TASK LODGED EXCLUSIVELY WITHIN THE PENTAGON IN THE FUTURE.

OFTEN THE MILITARY HAS EXHIBITED A BUILT-IN BIAS TO TAKE THE MOST DOUBT-FULL VIEW ON ENEMY THREAT ASSESSMENTS. THE "WORST-CASE" APPROACH SO OFTEN ADOPTED BY THE MILITARY LEADS TO THE MOST FRIGHTENING FORECASTS. THE RULE-OF-THUMB AT THE PENTAGON STILL APPEARS TO BE "THE BIGGER, THE BETTER." DISTORTIONS IN THESE JUDGMENTS SOMETIMES ARISE THROUGH PRESSURES TO JUSTIFY LARGER MILITARY BUDGETS OR NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS.

IN CONTRAST, THE CIA NATIONAL ESTIMATES PROCESS IS MORE APT TO BE FREE OF SUCH SELF-SERVING INTERESTS. THIS IS WHY

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WAS CREATED IN THE FIRST PLACE. IT WAS TO BE AN AGENCY WITHOUT POLICY BLINDERS; ONE DEDICATED, AS ALLEN DULLES PUT IT, "TO GET AT THE HARD FACTS ON WHICH OTHERS MUST DETERMINE POLICY."

LIEUT. GENERAL DANIEL O. GRAHAM, DIRECTOR OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY UNTIL THE ADMINISTRATION SHAKE-UP LAST WEEK, WROTE RECENTLY THAT HE THOUGHT THE TIME WAS "RIPE FOR THE MILITARY PROFESSION TO REASSERT ITS TRADITIONAL ROLE IN THE FUNCTION OF DESCRIBING MILITARY THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY." ONE MUST VIEW WITH SOME ALARM THE PROSPECT OF A SILENCED CIA SUCCUMBING TO AN INCREASINGLY DOMINANT MILITARY VOICE IN CALCULATING THE FOREIGN THREAT TO OUR NATION.

THE ABM DEBATE IN CONGRESS A FEW YEARS AGO ILLUSTRATES THE PROBLEM. IN THE DEBATE, LARGE OUTLAYS AS WELL AS QUESTIONS OF U.S. SECURITY IN THE 1970'S RODE ON THE DECISION OF WHETHER TO DEPLOY A NATIONWIDE ABM SYSTEM. THE DEBATE WAS MARKED BY CONFLICTING ANALYSES AND DIFFERING FORECASTS BETWEEN THE CIA AND THE MILITARY OF WHAT THE USSR COULD ACHIEVE WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS, GIVEN TIME. TECHNICAL DETAILS BECAME CRUCIAL FOR ASSESSING THE OPPOSING POINTS OF VIEW.

THE PENTAGON WAS DRIVEN BY ITS OWN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS, BASED ON A "WORST-CASE" ANALYSIS. THE QUESTIONS THEY ASKED THEMSELVES LED TO ONE ANSWER: THE NEED FOR A NATIONWIDE ABM SYSTEM. THE PRICE TAG WOULD HAVE BEEN SOMETHING LIKE \$100 BILLION, A BONANZA GUARANTEEING A BLOATED MILITARY BUDGET FOR YEARS TO COME.

THE CONGRESSIONAL COALITION AGAINST THE ABM HAD TO HAVE RELIABLE INFORMATION TO COUNTERACT THE REAMS OF DATA TURNED OUT BY THE MILITARY. THIS INFORMATION WAS AVAILABLE ONLY AT ONE SOURCE: THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. THE CIA HAD NO POLICY AXE TO GRIND, AND NO PRESSURES UPON IT TO PROTECT LUCRATIVE CONTRACTS. THROUGH A SERIES OF CIA BRIEFINGS, MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WERE GIVEN THE WHOLE RANGE OF INFORMATION ON THE

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE ABM SYSTEM. THESE BRIEFINGS WENT FAR BEYOND THE SELECTIVE DATA PROVIDED BY THE PENTAGON.

THE DATA PRESENTED BY THE CIA INDICATED THE FUTILITY OF AN ABM SYSTEM. SINCE NO WAY EXISTED TO PREVENT A SATURATION OF THE SYSTEM BY ENEMY MISSILES, THE ABMs WOULD NOT PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE SHIELD. THIS EVIDENCE ENABLED OPPONENTS TO MOUNT AN EFFECTIVE DEBATE AGAINST THE CONCEPT. BY 1967, CONGRESS HAD DECIDED THAT A NATIONWIDE ABM DEPLOYMENT AGAINST A SOVIET ATTACK WAS NOT DESIRABLE AND EVEN A LIMITED ABM DEPLOYMENT WAS APPROVED IN THE SENATE BY ONLY A SINGLE VOTE. THE INSIGHTS PROVIDED BY THE CIA BRIEFINGS HELPED IMMEASURABLY TO STOP THE STAMPEDE TOWARD THE COSTLY DECISION TO CONSTRUCT A NATIONAL SYSTEM, AND LAID THE FOUNDATION FOR A READY ACCEPTANCE OF THE ABM TREATY WHICH SOON FOLLOWED.

AS RECENTLY AS LAST WEEK, CIA TESTIMONY BEFORE CONGRESS CONTRADICTED CLAIMS BY THE PENTAGON THAT MASSIVE SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUPS ARE REDUCING THE UNITED STATES TO THE STATUS OF A SECOND-RATE POWER. IN CONTRAST TO GLOOMY DEFENSE DEPARTMENT ESTIMATES, THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FIGURES INDICATED THAT SOVIET MILITARY SPENDING HAS NOT LEPT FORWARD AT ALL. INSTEAD IT HAS BEEN INCREASING AT THE STEADY 3 PERCENT ANNUAL RATE WHICH IT HAS MAINTAINED FOR THE PAST 10 YEARS.

MOREOVER, NOTED THE CIA, A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF SOVIET MILITARY SPENDING HAS NOTHING DIRECTLY TO DO WITH THE UNITED STATES, SUCH AS THE EXPENSES INCURRED BY THEIR POSITIONING OF GREAT NUMBERS OF FORCES ALONG THE CHINESE-SOVIET FRONTIER. ALSO, THE CIA HAS TAKEN A MUCH CALMER VIEW OF SOVIET NAVAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN THAN HAVE ASSESSMENTS PREPARED BY THE U.S. NAVY OR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE--WHO JUST HAPPEN TO HAVE A DIEGO GARCIA CURE-ALL. WITHOUT THESE INDEPENDENT CIVILIAN CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE CIA, WE WOULD BE FORCED TO RELY SOLELY ON THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW. THE CONGRESS CAN ILL AFFORD TO DO WITHOUT THE MORE IMPARTIAL JUDGMENTS OFFERED BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

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HOWEVER, IT IS NOT ONLY A MATTER OF STANDING UP TO THE PENTAGON. WE NEED A CIA THAT CAN RESIST ALL THE PARTISAN PRESSURES WHICH MAY BE BROUGHT TO BEAR BY VARIOUS GROUPS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT--INCLUDING PARTISAN PRESSURES FROM THE WHITE HOUSE ITSELF. WE MUST SEEK TO INSULATE THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FROM THE EBB AND FLOW OF POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE MUST ALWAYS SELECT A DIRECTOR FROM WITHIN THE AGENCY OR FROM OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT. THE CRITICAL FACTOR IS THE SELECTION OF A PERSON OF DEMONSTRATED INDEPENDENCE, SOMEONE WHO WOULD HAVE THE ABILITY TO SAY: "NO, MR. PRESIDENT, I BELIEVE YOU ARE WRONG. ACCORDING TO OUR BEST INFORMATION, THE POLICY YOU PROPOSE WILL FAIL. IT IS BASED UPON INCORRECT ASSUMPTIONS, WHICH ARE CONTRADICTED BY THE UNDERLYING FACTS." WITHOUT THIS STRENGTH OF RESOLUTION IN ITS DIRECTOR, THE IMPORTANT ROLE THAT THE CIA CAN PLAY IN OUR GOVERNMENT WILL BE LOST.

THIS IS WHY THE APPOINTMENT OF AMBASSADOR GEORGE BUSH IS SO ILL-ADVISED. IT IS ONE THING TO CHOOSE AN INDIVIDUAL WHO MAY HAVE HAD POLITICAL EXPERIENCE, AND QUITE ANOTHER TO CHOOSE SOMEONE WHOSE PRINCIPAL POLITICAL ROLE HAS BEEN THAT OF CHAIRMAN OF THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE. THERE IS NO NEED TO ELIMINATE FROM CONSIDERATION AN INDIVIDUAL SIMPLY BECAUSE HE OR SHE MAY HAVE HELD PUBLIC OFFICE. BUT THE LINE MUST BE DRAWN SOMEWHERE, AND A MAN OF MR. BUSH'S PROLONGED INVOLVEMENT IN PARTISAN ACTIVITIES AT THE HIGHEST PARTY LEVEL SURELY PASSES OVER THAT LINE.

INDEED, IT APPEARS THAT MR. BUSH'S NOMINATION TO BE DIRECTOR OF THE CIA MAY EVEN BE REGARDED AT THE WHITE HOUSE AS A SPRINGBOARD TO HIGHER POLITICAL OFFICE. WHEN ASKED AT A PRESS CONFERENCE IF THE NOMINATION OF MR. BUSH WOULD ELIMINATE HIM AS A VICE-PRESIDENTIAL RUNNING-MATE POSSIBILITY, PRESIDENT

FORD REPLIED: "I DON'T THINK [HE'S] ELIMINATED FROM CONSIDERATION BY ANYBODY. THE DELEGATES TO THE CONVENTION OR MYSELF." MR. BUSH ALSO LEAVES THE DOOR OPEN. WHEN ASKED BY A REPORTER IN PEKING WHETHER THIS NEW ASSIGNMENT WOULD END A POLITICAL CAREER THAT COULD LEAD TO A VICE-PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION, HIS RESPONSE WAS: "WELL, I'M NOT SURE I'VE ENDED IT FOREVER"

IF CIA ASSESSMENTS SHOULD COLLIDE WITH A FAVORED COURSE OF ACTION AT THE WHITE HOUSE, WOULD A DEDICATED PARTY-MAN LIKE MR. BUSH BE ABLE TO STAND UP TO PRESSURES FROM A REPUBLICAN PRESIDENT IN AN ELECTION YEAR? THE QUESTION ANSWERS ITSELF. BUSH IS A LIKEABLE MAN, WHO MAY BE WELL-SUITED FOR POLITICAL OFFICE. BUT HE IS NOT THE MAN TO HEAD UP THE CIA.

I FIND THE PRESIDENT'S APPOINTMENT ASTONISHING. THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE COMMITTEES--NOT TO MENTION THE PRESIDENT'S OWN COMMISSION ON INTELLIGENCE--HAVE LABORED FOR MONTHS REVIEWING THE PROBLEMS OF THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. THESE PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN PLENTIFUL, AND THE AREAS FOR NEW LEGISLATION ARE MANY. STILL, THE PROSPECTS FOR STARTING AFRESH ARE GOOD, AND I HAVE VIEWED THE CHANCES TO RESTORE PUBLIC TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE CIA WITH CONSIDERABLE OPTIMISM.

BUT THIS IS NO WAY TO BEGIN THE RESTORATION. NO NEW SET OF LAWS, NO NEW GUIDING PRINCIPLES--REGARDLESS OF HOW SKILLFULLY DRAWN--WILL RESTORE THIS TRUST IF THE CREDENTIALS OF THE NEW DIRECTOR RAISE SERIOUS QUESTIONS OF PROPRIETY.

LET US NOT UNDERMINE THE GOOD WORK OF THE ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION AND THE COMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE AND SENATE BY PLACING A FORMER PARTY CHAIRMAN AT THE HEAD OF A HIGHLY SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

LET US NOT MAKE A TRAVESTY OUT OF OUR EFFORTS TO REFORM THE CIA. THE SENATE AND THE PEOPLE WE REPRESENT HAVE THE RIGHT TO INSIST UPON A CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WHICH IS POLITICALLY NEUTRAL AND TOTALLY PROFESSIONAL.

I URGE SENATORS TO STAND UP AND OPPOSE THIS NOMINATION.
I CAN CHOOSE NO OTHER COURSE, FOR IF THE CIA IS TO PLAY ITS
INTENDED ROLE IN OUR GOVERNMENT, IT MUST BE IMPARTIAL AND
NON-POLITICAL. ITS ABILITY TO BE SO DEPENDS, IN THE FINAL
ANALYSIS, ON A DIRECTOR WHO POSSESSES THESE SAME QUALITIES.